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Abstract: The willingness to punish norm violation is an important component of many 
legal and social institutions, and much prior research demonstrates an apparent willingness 
to incur costs to punish individuals who act unfairly. But, will people rely on “excuses” to 
get out of having to act on costly punishment intentions, as they do with other costly pro-
social acts? And how may the answer to this question depend on whether the punisher is 
the victim of a norm violation or an independent third party? We conduct an experiment 
and find that third parties punish reluctantly: although they indicate a preference to punish, 
they choose to avoid the opportunity to punish when they can do so without explicitly 
revealing that this is their preference. In contrast, second parties, who have been directly 
wronged, are resolute punishers—they actively seek out the opportunity to punish, even 
misrepresenting random outcomes in order to ensure that punishment is implemented. Our 
findings highlight important differences in the motives underlying second- and third-party 
punishment. 
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1. Introduction 
Numerous studies provide evidence that individuals’ willingness to incur a cost to punish anti-
social actions is one mechanism through which societies can promote pro-social behavior 
(Yamagishi, 1986; Henrich et al., 2006; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; 
Carpenter and Matthews, 2012; Charness et al., 2008). However, identifying the exact role of 
voluntary punishment in promoting cooperation and pro-sociality requires an improved 
understanding of the robustness of punishment behavior. Recent research on “moral wiggle 
room” and “reluctant altruism”—i.e., the tendency to voluntarily share wealth at a personal cost 
when confronted with a direct request, but to seek out excuses to avoid sharing altogether—
shows that altruistic behavior, such as charitable giving, diminishes significantly if people can 
avoid the opportunity to give or possess excuses for not giving (Dana et al, 2006; Broberg et al., 
2007; Dana et al., 2007; Haisley and Weber, 2010; Andreoni et al., 2011; Lazear et al., 2012; 
DellaVigna et al., 2012). These findings raise important questions for human social behavior 
more broadly (Malmendier et al., 2014).  
In this paper, we investigate to what extent reluctance also applies to costly punishment. 
That is, when people are provided with opportunities to avoid engaging in costly punishment, 
without having to explicitly state that they do not want to punish, does the frequency of 
punishment of norm violation decrease? Moreover, does the answer to this question vary by 
whether the punisher is an independent outsider (third party) or a victim (second party) of the 
original transgression? The extent to which economic agents are reluctant punishers may provide 
insights into when we are likely to observe punishment in natural contexts and into the extent to 
which voluntary punishment can be an effective instrument for supporting pro-social and 
efficiency enhancing behavior.  
To see why, consider how different motives may yield very different punishment 
behaviors and outcomes in the presence of opportunities to avoid carrying out punishment acts. 
On one hand, people may be resolute punishers of wrongdoing in the sense that they derive 
positive utility from punishing those who transgress norms, even when doing so is costly and it is 
possible to avoid the punishment opportunity. Hence, for some people, the satisfaction from 
punishing wrongdoing may exceed the costs of actually carrying out the punishment, thus 
making these people steadfast in seeing through punishment opportunities. For example, it may 
be that observing anti-social behavior arouses negative emotions such as anger, which may be 
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relieved through the act of punishing. Although behavioral and neuro-imaging studies show that 
people feel angry when being treated unfairly and that such negative emotion triggers second-
party punishment (Fehr and Gachter, 2002; Sanfey et al., 2003; Xiao and Houser, 2005), the role 
of anger in third-party punishment remains unclear (Carlsmith et al., 2002; Batson et al., 2007; 
Pedersen et al. 2013; Jordan et al. 2015).  
On the other hand, people facing the opportunity to punish wrongdoers may be reluctant 
punishers because they feel obligated to do so by social and ethical norms. A social obligation to 
punish may explain findings that publicity and anticipated guilt increase third party punishment 
behavior (Kurzban et al., 2007; Piazza and Bering, 2008) and that opportunities to compensate 
the victims (Bicchieri and Chavez, 2013) or to withhold help to the transgressors (Nikiforakis 
and Mitchell, 2014; Balafoutas et al. 2014) often reduce the frequency of punishment. The desire 
to be respected and evaluated positively by both others and even one's self can provide a 
unifying interpretation for complex aspects of human pro-social behavior (Akerlof and Kranton, 
2000; Benabou and Tirole, 2006; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2011; DellaVigna et al., 2012).1 
When punishing misconduct is socially desirable, an individual might feel compelled to incur 
costs to punish wrongdoers, without really wanting to do so. Hence, such an individual may also 
avoid carrying out costly punishment when an opportunity arises to do so while nevertheless 
stating a desire to punish. In view of the extensive literature demonstrating reluctance in other 
costly pro-social behaviors, costly punishment—especially third party punishment—might also 
be reluctant. Hence, such punishment may be sensitive to whether potential punishers can 
metaphorically “turn a blind eye”—that is, hide behind circumstances that allow them to avoid 
the punishment opportunity.  
To test and compare the robustness of punishment behavior of both second and third 
parties, we conducted three variants of a dictator game experiment with punishment 
opportunities. Our primary purpose was to examine the extent to which third parties, as 
compared with second parties, choose to capitalize on an opportunity to secretly limit their 
ability to act on a stated intention to punish a wrongdoer. That is, to what extent do second- and 
third-party punishers demonstrate reluctance or resoluteness in their punishment behavior, when 
                                                            
1 Van der Weele et al. (2014) show that the availability of an excuse has no effect on the reciprocal behavior in a 
context involving positive reciprocity—specifically a trust game—and argue that image concerns are not a key 
driver of reciprocal behavior. In contrast, Malmendier et al. (2014) find evidence of reluctance in reciprocal 
behavior that is similar in magnitude to the reluctance in one-sided dictator games. 
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confronted with an opportunity to avoid having to carry out a costly punishment act while 
“saving face” by nevertheless expressing an intention to punish? 
Previous laboratory experiments studying voluntary punishment typically provide 
decision makers with clear choices (e.g., how much to punish) and direct mappings from choices 
into outcomes. Our experiment differs from these previous experiments in that we allow the 
decision maker to indicate the intention to punish but also subsequently to manipulate the ability 
to punish without doing so transparently. Specifically, punishers first decide whether and how 
much to punish the dictator, and such “intended” punishment decisions are visible to all relevant 
parties. But we then allow a random outcome to determine whether punishment decisions can 
actually be enacted, and let those making the punishment decisions secretly misreport the 
random outcome. By doing so, our experiment allows us to examine the extent to which 
punishing behavior is reluctant or resolute. In our experiment, a resolute punisher will actively 
seek the opportunity to punish, even if punishment is costly; a reluctant punisher, after 
demonstrating the intention to punish, will try to avoid the opportunity to implement costly 
punishment when excuses for doing so are available.  
This design is a step closer to many natural settings in which individuals can often 
manipulate the circumstances and context (Dana et al, 2006; Dana et al., 2007; Lazear et al, 
2012). As an example of resolute punishment, a disgruntled employee who feels personally 
wronged by co-workers or an employer may go out of his way to cause them harm—perhaps 
stalking them or seeking opportunities for a confrontation. An extreme instance of such behavior 
is the murder by Vester Lee Flanagan II in 2015 of two of his former co-workers at a local news 
station who he felt had wronged him. On the other hand, a reluctant punisher may pretend not to 
notice transgressions when it may be personally costly to act to punish them. This is what the 
Freeh Report, commissioned by the Board of Trustees of the Pennsylvania State University, 
concluded was done by high-ranking university officials, including President Graham Spanier 
and football coach Joe Paterno, in response to child sexual molestation by a prominent assistant 
coach, Jerry Sandusky. 
Our experimental findings provide clear evidence for the reluctance of third-party 
punishment and for the resoluteness of second-party punishment. Many third parties who express 
a willingness to engage in costly punishment nevertheless exploit a loophole in the environment 
in order to avoid actually having to carry out the punishment act. However, second parties 
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exhibit the opposite pattern in their behavior—they resolutely seek out the ability to punish, 
going as far as to misreport random outcomes in order to ensure that the punishment act is 
carried out. That is, people tend to turn a blind eye to the wrongdoers when they are unaffected 
observers but do not turn the other cheek, accepting the transgression without any retaliation, 
when they are the victims.2  
Our findings yield two important insights regarding the punishment behavior of 
economic agents. First, we provide clean empirical evidence that sheds light on the differences in 
the nature of the motives underlying second- and third-party punishment. Punishment by those 
who have been personally wronged may reflect more of a “true” or “internal” preference, while 
punishment on behalf of others appears to be driven more by external considerations, such as 
social pressure or image concerns. Second, our findings also raise important issues for the design 
of institutions in which second- and third-party punishment are possible, but where people may 
have the ability to avoid the opportunity or obligation to punish. The reluctance of punishment 
by third parties may make it infrequent and may diminish the extent to which it is an instrument 
that discourages anti-social behavior. Conversely, however, retaliation by those personally 
wronged may be widespread—and may even occur in situations where it is socially undesirable 
(Houser and Xiao, 2010). 
 
2. Experimental Design 
Our experiment is a revised version of prior experiments on second- and third-party punishment 
(Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004) and consists of two stages. In Stage 1 (the dictator game stage), 
one party has the option to voluntarily share or not share with a second party.3 Stage 2 (the 
punishment stage) consists of two parts. In the first part, the opportunity to punish the first 
party—at a cost—is offered to either the directly affected second party or to a neutral third party, 
depending on the treatment condition. In the second part of the punishment stage, a random 
process determines whether the punishment decision in the first part is implemented. However, 
                                                            
2 The idiom “turn a blind eye” means to pretend not to notice and is said to have originated when, during the Battle 
of Copenhagen (1801), Admiral Horatio Nelson held a telescope to his one blind eye and declared that he did not see 
the signal flags ordering him to “discontinue the action.” The phrase “turn the other cheek” means to refrain from 
retaliation and alludes to the words of Jesus as described in the New Testament, Matthew 5:39 KJV. 
3 One advantage of using a dictator game to address our research question is that it is a fairly simple game. Given the 
complication of the punishment implementation stage in our experiment, it is important to keep the game as simple 
as possible.  
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our two main treatments provide subjects the opportunity to misreport the random outcome, 
thereby avoiding having to carry out the costly punishment.  
 
2.1 Experimental Conditions 
The experiment consists of two principal experimental conditions: third-party 
punishment with self report (3P Self Report) and second-party punishment with self report (2P 
Self Report). In addition, we conducted a control condition, third-party punishment with 
verification (3P Verified), to address a potential interpretation of behavior in the 3P Self Report 
condition.4 
In the first condition, 3P Self Report, three parties form a group. Group members make 
decisions across two stages.  
In Stage 1, the first party (Participant A) has the opportunity to act fairly or unfairly 
toward the second party (Participant B), in allocating 100 points between the two participants. In 
each group, Participant A decides whether to give 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, or 50 points to Participant B, 
keeping the remainder of the 100 points for him or herself. A third party (Participant C) receives 
a fixed amount of 50 points. Points are worth 10 cents each.  
Stage 2 is the punishment stage and consists of two parts. In the first part, we elicit 
punishment strategies from the third party, Participant C. Specifically, for each of the possible 
actions taken by the first party in the first stage, Participant C chooses how many deduction 
points (between 0 and 50) to assign to Participant A. Participant C is also told that all his/her 
decision will be shown to Participants A and B at the end.5 Following Fehr and Fischbacher 
(2004), each assigned deduction point reduces Participant C’s final earnings by one point and 
Participant A's final earnings by three points. Participant B's earnings are unaffected by 
Participant C's punishment decision. Such designs have previously demonstrated a willingness to 
punish among significant proportions of third parties (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). 
                                                            
4 Instructions for all three treatments are provided in Appendices A, B, and C. 
5 We attempted to use a design as similar as possible to Fehr & Fischbacher (2004), including using the strategy 
method to elicit punishment choices. The strategy method is desirable because it allows us to obtain meaningful 
observations on punishment behavior in cases where Participant A acts fairly. One main disadvantage of using 
strategy method is that it might diminish the role of emotion in decision making. If emotion plays a more important 
role in second-party punishment than in third-party punishment, the strategy method could lead to less punishment 
driven by emotion and make it harder to observe the difference that we find between the second- and the third-party 
punishment treatments. Thus, the differences we observe in our data might be viewed as a lower bound of the 
difference between second- and third-party punishment. 	
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The novel feature of our design is the second part of Stage 2. This part mimics aspects of 
many natural environments, whereby third parties may vary in their actual opportunity to execute 
the intent to punish a wrongdoer, and may have some ability to manipulate this opportunity. For 
example, a transgressor may escape before a third party can act, or a third party may simply not 
observe or be aware of the transgression. Moreover, such contextual features may also allow 
third parties the possibility of misrepresenting whether they are actually limited in their ability to 
punish—or to “turn a blind eye” to a potentially punishable transgression. 
We implement this feature in the second part of Stage 2 by having the third party roll a 
die to determine whether or not the punishment decision made in the first part of Stage 2 is 
actually enacted. In particular, each Participant C receives a cup with a die inside. The 
experimenter then announces publicly, “If you are Participant C, please roll the die privately in 
your cup at least five times to verify that it is a fair six-sided die. Once you have rolled it enough 
times to be satisfied it is a fair die, roll it privately one more time. You do not need to announce 
when you are rolling for the final time. Then report the result of your final roll below and click 
the ‘Submit’ button.” Participants were told that an even number in the final roll corresponds to 
states of the world in which the punishment is actually carried out, while an odd number creates 
outcomes in which no punishment is enacted and the third party incurs no cost. Thus, if 
Participant C rolls and reports the results in an unbiased manner, then there is a 50% probability 
that any attempt to punish by Participant C is irrelevant and the outcome is identical to one in 
which there is no possibility of punishment.  
Importantly, note that the design calls for Participant C to roll the die several times 
privately, to decide when to roll one final time, and to only report the outcome of the last die roll. 
That is, Participant C can decide privately and independently when to stop, and which die roll 
will “count.” By deciding on their own which roll is final, participants can not only keep the 
truth secret but also potentially manipulate the truth. That is, our design allows participants to 
deceive not only others but also themselves. A reluctant punisher who does not truly desire to 
punish but does so only due to image concerns, even self-image concerns, can represent a desire 
to punish a transgressor (despite the cost) in the first part of Stage 2, while manipulating or 
misrepresenting the outcome of the die roll to produce an odd number, so the costly punishment 
does not actually take place and the punisher incurs no cost in the end. On the other hand, a 
resolute punisher who truly desires to punish the wrongdoer can specify the decision to incur the 
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cost to punish and then manipulate or misreport the die roll outcome to ensure that it is 
implemented. 
By comparing the distribution of reported die rolls to the known distribution of outcomes 
of a fair die, we can identify whether the third parties are intentionally avoiding or seeking out 
the ability to enact costly punishment by selectively reporting the die roll outcomes that they 
prefer (Fischbacher and Heusi-Follmi, 2003; Shalvi et al., 2011). Of course, a preference for 
strictly acting honestly may still prevent an individual from manipulating or misrepresenting the 
die roll outcome. Therefore, for example, even if all third parties are reluctant punishers, we 
might observe less than 100 percent of punishing third parties reporting odd numbers simply 
because some reluctant punishers are also unwilling to manipulate the outcome for these stakes. 
Similarly, resolute punishers may not always report even numbers. Hence, we expect the 
proportion of realized odd die rolls to lie between 50 and 100 percent for reluctant punishers and 
between 0 and 50 percent for resolute punishers. For the purpose of our study, the key statistic 
for uncovering whether punishment is, on average, resolute or reluctant is whether the reported 
proportion of even rolls lies significantly above or below 50 percent. 
Our other principal condition, second party with self-report (2P Self Report), is a 
modification of 3P Self Report that allows us to explore the extent to which second-party 
punishment is resolute or reluctant—i.e., whether it is similarly sensitive to the opportunity to 
avoid acting on a stated preference for punishment. In 2P Self Report, there is no third party 
(Participant C), and it is Participant B who has the opportunity to specify punishment for 
Participant A and then privately roll a die in Stage 2. Hence, Participant B serves the role of both 
the recipient of the Stage 1 decision and potential punisher in Stage 2. The punishment decision 
and die roll are otherwise identical to those in the 3P Self Report condition. As with 3P Self 
Report, the distribution of die rolls reported in 2P Self Report informs of us the nature of the 
punishment decisions. A reluctant second-party punisher may use the private die roll opportunity 
to report an odd-numbered outcome, and thereby avoid having to punish, while a resolute 
punisher determined to see the punishment through will report an even-numbered outcome.  
Finally, we note that an alternative interpretation of a high proportion of reported odd-
numbered die outcomes is that individuals who would normally not incur a cost to punish state 
otherwise in order to voice their (costless) disapproval of the first party's actions (Xiao and 
Houser, 2005). They can guarantee that signaling such disapproval is costless by reporting an 
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odd-numbered outcome for the die roll in Stage 2. Thus, under this interpretation, a low 
frequency of even numbers reported does not inform us of the true preferences of the people who 
would otherwise punish, but instead reflects the actions of people who would not punish if there 
was no opportunity to misreport the die roll and who now claim that they would punish simply 
because they can get out of it. A key prediction under this interpretation is that the proportion of 
subjects who indicate a willingness to punish should be significantly higher when they can 
subsequently misreport the outcome of the die roll than when they cannot.  
 We report below that there is a high proportion of reported odd rolls in the 3P Self Report 
condition, but not in the 2P Self Report condition. It is therefore important to address the above 
possible alternative explanation only for the 3P Self Report results. For this reason, we 
conducted an additional treatment, third party with verification (3P Verified). 6  The only 
difference between the 3P Self Report and 3P Verified conditions is that, in the latter, the 
experimenter visually observed the third party's die roll and entered it into the computer. Hence, 
there was no opportunity to manipulate the outcome of the die roll. All subjects knew this in 
advance of their decisions. 
 
2.2 General Procedures 
We conducted experimental sessions at the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics 
Laboratory (P.E.E.L.). We targeted approximately 60 subjects in the role of punishers in each 
condition, but the actual number of observations varied slightly based on variance in recruiting 
and in the number of participants attending sessions. Specifically, the experiment consisted of 10 
sessions of the 3P Self Report condition with a total of 174 subjects (58 punishers), 9 sessions of 
the 3P Verified condition with a total of 165 subjects (55 punishers), and 7 sessions of the 2P 
Self Report condition with a total of 122 subjects (61 punishers).7  
                                                            
6 We ran 3P Verified treatment after we obtained evidence of a high proportion of reported odd rolls (i.e. not to 
implement the stated punishment) in the 3P Self Report condition, but not in the 2P Self Report condition. Because 
the Verified condition is designed only to test the alternative explanation of the high proportion of reported odd rolls, 
we did not run a 2P Verified treatment.  
7 These numbers exclude one pair in the 2P Self Report condition in which the subject in the role of Participant B 
opted to leave the experiment after the instructions were completed but before any decisions were made. We 
targeted 60 subjects with the opportunity to punish in the 3P-Self-Report and 2P-Self-Report conditions. With 60 
subjects, the empirical frequencies of punishment from Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) yield, in expectation, 37 third-
party punishers (60*.61) and 44 second-party punishers (60*.74). In the former case, this gives us 94 percent power 
to detect a proportion that differs from 50 percent by +/- 25 percent at p < 0.05 in a two-sided test; in the latter case 
we have 97 percent power (Chow, Shao & Wang, 2008). 
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Each session lasted approximately 45 minutes. The experiment was conducted using the 
software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Following role assignment and instructions, subjects 
completed a quiz through the computer interface to verify understanding of the instructions 
before making any decisions. Once all subjects successfully completed the quiz, the computer 
monitor showed them the decision screens relevant to their role. Subjects in the role of dictator 
made their allocation decisions. Then, subjects in the role of punisher specified, for each possible 
amount shared by the dictator, how many deduction points to assign. Once all punishment 
strategies were elicited, the experimenter distributed to each potential punisher a die inside a cup 
and instructed them to use this die to determine whether the punishment decision would be 
implemented. In the 3P Verified condition, the experimenter went to each subject in the role of 
punisher sequentially, observed the die roll, and entered this outcome into the computer. 
At the end of the experiment, subjects saw all the decisions made by each party, the 
reported die roll, and final outcome for their group, but received no information on what 
happened in other groups. Subjects were informed during the instructions that in the event that a 
player ended the experiment with negative points, the negative earnings would be deducted from 
the $8 payment each subject received for participating in the experiment.8 
 
3. Results 
Our primary interest is in the frequencies with which subjects with the possibility to punish state 
the intention to do so, and subsequently enact the stated punishment decision in the conditions 
with self-reported die rolls. Providing an overview of the results, Figure 1 presents the 
frequencies of stated punishment intentions and enacted punishment across the three treatment 
conditions. 
 
3.1 Robustness of Third-party Punishment 
Our first finding is that reluctance appears to be a central component of third-party punishment, 
as evidenced by the unusually low frequency of reported even die-roll outcomes. Of the 58 
Participants C in the 3P Self Report condition, 23 (39.7 percent) made the initial decision, in 
                                                            
8 Including the participation payment, mean earnings in the 2P Self Report condition were $14.25 for the first party 
and $9.70 for the second party. Means earnings in the 3P Self Report condition were $17.18 for the first party, $8.69 
for the second party, and $12.96 for the third party. Mean earnings in the 3P Verified condition were $16.41 for the 
first party, $8.89 for the second party, and $12.77 for the third party.  
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Stage 2, to punish (at a cost to themselves) at least one of the potential actions of the first party.9 
If they were reporting die roll outcomes as the result of a natural and unbiased random process, 
we would expect 50% of these subjects to report an even number. However, only 5 of 23 third 
parties (21.7%) reported rolling an even number, which is statistically unlikely from an unbiased 
random process (p < 0.02 in a binomial test). Thus, consistent with reluctance in third party 
punishment, we find that third parties who expressed a willingness to incur costs to punish 
transgressing first parties also tended to misrepresent the outcome of the die roll in a manner that 
“prevented” them from being able to actually implement this costly action. As a result of such 
reluctance, and the manipulation opportunity afforded by the private die roll, third party 
punishment is rare in the 3P Self Report condition: only 5 of 58 third parties (8.6 percent) 
effectively implemented punishment of the first party. 
In addition to reluctance, another possible interpretation of the high frequency of reported 
odd rolls is that some Participants C who would not otherwise choose to incur a cost to punish 
Participants A in Stage 2 can now do so costlessly—e.g., to express their disapproval—by 
simply reporting an odd die roll outcome in the second part of Stage 2. Data from the 3P Verified 
treatment do not support this alternative explanation. We find that 19 of 55 (34.5%) Participants 
C in this condition chose to punish at least one of the actions of the first party, which is very 
close to and does not significantly differ from the 39.7 percent who chose to punish in the 3P 
Self Report condition (fisher’s exact test, p=0.70). The punishment rate of 34.5 percent in the 3P 
Verified treatment implies an expected effective punishment rate of 17.3 percent—one half of 
the total choosing to punish—which is twice as high as the effective punishment rate by third 
parties in the 3P Self Report condition (8.6 percent)10.  
Hence, the low rate of reported even rolls in 3P Self Report does not appear to be driven 
by additional Participants C indicating they would punish only because they knew they could 
avoid it subsequently. Most of the difference in behavior between these two conditions lies in the 
implementation of the punishment, rather than in the statement of an intention to punish. This is 
further supported by regression analyses, discussed in Section 3.3, which show that the verified 
die roll has no significant effect on third parties’ Stage 2 probability of stating a preference for 
                                                            
9 This frequency of costly third party punishment is lower than has been found in some prior experiments. For 
example, Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) found 61% of third parties (and 74% of second parties) were willing to 
punish unfair actions. 
10 As expected, the realization rate of intended punishment in 3P Self Report condition does not statistically differ 
from 50% (p=0.17) in a binomial test. 
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punishment, the average amount of punishment among those that do punish, or their sensitivity 
to the amount Participant A gives. That is, the stated punishment intention is very similar 
between the 3P Self Report and 3P Verified conditions. Therefore, we attribute the approximate 
halving of enacted punishment to the fact that Participants C had the ability to act on their true 
preferences. That is, the veil of randomness provided by the die roll shields reluctant third-party 
punishers from social image concerns and allows them to “turn a blind eye” to the first party’s 
transgression, thus circumventing the responsibility to punish.  
 
3.2 Robustness of Second-party Punishment 
The 2P Self Report condition allows us to explore the extent to which second-party punishment 
is resolute or reluctant—i.e., whether it is similarly sensitive to the opportunity to avoid acting on 
a stated preference for punishment, as is the case with third-party punishment. As shown in 
Figure 1, 35 of 61 (57.4 percent) second parties chose to punish at least one of the possible 
actions by the first party. Of these 35 subjects who elected to punish, 24 (68.6 percent) reported 
rolling an even number and therefore had their punishment decision enacted. This proportion is 
statistically significantly greater than the 50 percent we would expect if second parties were 
honestly reporting the outcome of the die roll (p < 0.05 in a binomial test). Thus, in contrast with 
the reluctance exhibited by third parties, second-party punishers are not willing to “turn the other 
cheek” and refrain from retaliation after being treated unfairly. Instead, not only do they not use 
the die roll as an excuse to avoid implementing the punishment, some of the second parties even 
appear to be willing to misreport the die roll to ensure the punishment is enacted.11 
  
3.3 Punishment Amounts 
In addition to the decision of whether to punish, we also examine the punishment amount 
assigned by second- or third-party punishers. Figure 2 plots the mean stated punishment 
expenditures, for those subjects who indicated a willingness to punish at least one of the possible 
decisions by Participant A. There is a clear difference in the punishment intensity between 
                                                            
11 The preceding analyses focus on the frequency of subjects who chose to punish at least one of the possible actions 
by the first party, which gives us the largest number of stated punishment decisions. To check the robustness of the 
results, we also examined the frequency of those who punish at least twice, three times, and so on. We obtain the 
same qualitative results—proportions of enacted punishment vary between 15 and 27 percent for third parties and 
between 69 and 72 percent for second parties. However, the samples are smaller and the significance levels of the 
binomial tests are sometimes weaker. All the results are reported in Appendix D. 
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second and third parties. Specifically, for all actions by Participant A that depart from fairness, 
second parties who punish do so more intensely, on average, than do third parties. Overall, the 
mean of implemented punishment amounts is significantly lower in the 3P Self Report than that 
in the 2P Self Report treatment (2.45 vs. 7.48, t117=3.445, p<0.001).12  
Importantly, when we look at punishment amounts in the two versions of the experiment 
with third-party punishment, we do not observe a difference between the punishment behavior of 
those third parties whose die rolls would be verified (3P Verified) and those who were free to 
report any outcome (3P Self Report). There is no significant difference in the average 
punishment amount between the two treatments (2.45 vs. 2.08, t111=0.414, p=0.68). This 
supports our earlier conclusion that expressed third party intentions do not differ between the two 
conditions. 
Further evidence that the ability to subsequently reverse stated punishment intentions did 
not influence punishment behavior is observed when comparing those who ultimately reported 
the ability to punish (even-numbered die rolls) with those who ultimately reported an inability to 
punish (odd-numbered die rolls). Figure 2 reveals no differences in intended intensity of 
punishment for the two groups (3P Self Report: Mean punishment of 5.13 for even die rolls vs. 
6.46 for odd die rolls, Mann-Whitney rank-sum test, p=.79; 2P Self Report: Mean punishment of 
12.91 for even die rolls vs. 13.35 for odd die rolls, Mann-Whitney rank-sum test, p=0.90). For 
the 3P Self Report and 2P Self Report conditions, the lack of a difference is meaningful—it 
indicates that the decision of whether and how much to punish, made in the first part of Stage 2, 
is not influenced by whether one is likely to ultimately avoid implementing the punishment.  
 
3.3. Modeling the Punishment and Die Roll Decisions 
We next model the punishment and die-roll-reporting decisions, using regression analysis, as a 
way of understanding the statistical relationships observed in Figures 1 and 2. Table 1 compares 
the behavior of punishers in the two conditions with self-reported die roll outcomes (3P Self 
Report and 2P Self Report). Models 1 and 2 address the decision of whether and how much to 
punish in the first part of Stage 2 (i.e. the intended punishment). Then, in models 3 and 4, we 
                                                            
12 We also observe some subjects (21 out of 174) that state a preference for punishment even when Participant A 
gives 50. We interpret this as the anti-social punishment discussed in previous literature (e.g. Hermann, Thöni, 
Gächter, 2008). We see 10 (of 61) such subjects in 2P Self Report, 3 (of 58) in 3P Self Report, and 8 (of 55) in 3P 
Verified. 
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analyze the subsequent second part decision regarding reporting of the die roll (i.e. the actual 
punishment).  
Because the decision of whether to punish a wrongdoer is logically separable from the 
choice of the amount of punishment, we model the Stage 2 punishment decisions of our subjects 
in two stages. Such a hurdle model (Erkal et al., 2011) first examines the binary outcome of 
punishing or not punishing and then, if punishment is chosen, independently estimates the 
determinants of the amount of punishment selected. Because each subject makes six punishment 
decisions, one for each possible choice by Participant A, but observations are otherwise 
independent across subjects in the role of punisher, we include subject random effects.  
 In the first stage of the hurdle model (Table 1, model 1), we estimate a probit regression 
of the stated intention to punish on a binary variable identifying the 2P Self Report treatment, the 
amount that Participant A gives to Participant B (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, or 50), and the interactions 
between these. The dependent variable is the binary decision of whether to punish (1) or not (0). 
The 3P Self Report condition is the baseline against which the coefficient for 2nd Party Self 
Report measures differences. The results reveal that second parties are significantly more likely 
to state a preference for punishment when Participant A gives zero. As expected, we also observe 
that as the amount given by Participant A increases, the probability of punishing decreases. The 
sensitivity to giving by Participant A does not significantly differ between the 3P Self Report and 
2P Self Report conditions, indicated by the statistically insignificant interaction term. 
 The second stage of the hurdle model (Table 1, model 2) consists of a truncated linear 
regression of the punishment amount on the same independent variables. Here, we observe that, 
relative to third parties, second parties assign more deduction points to Participant A. 
Directionally, more punishment points are assigned to those Participants A who shared less, but 
this is not statistically significant. We again observe that punishment is not significantly more 
sensitive to initial sharing for second parties than for third parties. 
 Models 3 and 4 study punishment enactment in the second part of Stage 2 (i.e., self-
reported die rolls) for the 58 subjects who chose to punish in the first part (23 subjects in 3P Self 
Report and 35 in 2P Self Report). We confirm that second parties who chose to punish are 
significantly more likely to report die rolls that lead to punishment being enacted. In neither self-
report treatment is the mean punishment expenditure significantly predictive of whether 
punishment is enacted. That is, consistent with Figure 2, those people who subsequently enacted 
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punishment did not systematically indicate higher or lower punishment amounts in the first part 
of Stage 2. 
 The conclusion of this analysis is that there are significant differences in whether and 
how second and third parties enact costly punishment. Second parties punish both more 
frequently and more intensively.13 More importantly, for our purposes, they are more resolute in 
their punishment—they report many more die roll outcomes that allow the punishment decision 
to be enacted.14  
We also compare behavior in the two third-party punishment treatments, which vary 
based on whether the third party enacting the punishment can misreport the die roll (3P Self 
Report) or can not do so (3P Verified). Table 2 presents the hurdle model of the decision, in the 
first part of Stage 2, of whether or not to punish and, conditionally on doing so, of how much to 
punish. Consistent with our earlier analysis, we observe no significant difference between the 
two versions of the experiment with third-party punishers. While the probability of a third party 
punishing is sensitive to the amount given by Participant A, this sensitivity does not significantly 
depend on whether they will later be able to manipulate the outcome of the die roll (model 1). 
Similarly, the amount of punishment chosen by third parties does not depend on whether the die 
roll will be verified (model 2). Overall, the results in Table 2 provide strong support for our 
earlier observation that the decision of whether to state an intention to punish is not affected by 
whether the third party will subsequently have the opportunity to avoid implementing this 
decision by misreporting the die roll outcome. 
 
4. Discussion 
We provide evidence that the decisions of third parties to punish wrongdoers are often reluctant. 
That is, third parties who state an intention to punish norm transgressors often capitalize on the 
ability to avoid actually implementing the costly punishment act. In contrast, we find that 
second-party punishment is resolute. Second parties are not only more likely to pay a cost to 
                                                            
13 First parties (dictators) seem to anticipate this difference. While their behavior does not significantly differ 
between the 3P Self Report and 3P Verified treatments (χ2, p=.71), in the 2P Self Report treatment, dictators act 
more generously (χ2, p<.01). While 64% of dictators give zero in the third party treatments, only 26% do so in 2P 
Self Report. The mean amount given in 3P Self Report and 3P Verified are 6.9 and 8.9, respectively, while the mean 
amount given in 2P Self Report is 22.1 (p<.001 for comparison to each 3P treatment). 
14 Note that the comparisons between the second party and the third party in the regression results reported allow 
three possibilities: misreport in 2P Self Report but not in 3P Self Report, misreport in 3P Self Report but not in 2P 
Self Report, and misreport in both. The binomial tests we reported in the above two sections indicate that both 
parties tend to misreport—i.e., the proportions for each group differ from 50 percent—but in the opposite directions. 
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punish the wrongdoer, but they also seek out the opportunity to implement punishment and this 
desire is sufficiently strong to induce some subjects to manipulate otherwise random events in 
order to ensure that punishment is implemented. 
 Our work highlights the need to better understand the deeper motives underlying social 
behavior (Malmendier et al., 2014; Kurzban et al., 2007). In the case of resolute versus reluctant 
punishment, one possibility is that the primary motivators for third-party (often reluctant) 
punishment tend to be extrinsic, higher-order, socially constructed concepts such as image or 
duty, which can be actively managed and manipulated in self-interested ways. Resolute second-
party punishment, on the other hand, may be more intrinsically motivated, perhaps driven by 
emotions like anger. 
Our findings also illuminate recent discussions on the difference between punishment 
observed in the lab and in the field (Guala, 2012; Balafoutas and Nikiforakis, 2012). Cooperation 
in a society that relies heavily on spontaneous third-party punishment may not be sustainable if 
situations arise in which individuals responsible for implementing punishment, and bearing its 
costs, have the ability to escape this social burden in a manner that also allows them to save face. 
The comparisons between 3P Self Report and 3P Verified conditions further suggest that 
exogenously enforcing the implementation of punishment intentions will not change the initial 
stated severity of punishment for wrongdoings. An implication of these findings is that it may be 
beneficial for a society to eliminate opportunities that excuse otherwise uninvolved third parties 
from the responsibility of defending social order. In some cases, this may require additional 
incentives, such as rewards or legal obligations, to compel people to take costly actions to 
sanction norm violations when they are not directly impacted by a transgression. Hence, “good 
Samaritan” or “duty to rescue” laws, which diminish the reasons one can provide as exculpation 
for not having intervened in rendering aid, may partly reflect reactions to justifications employed 
by reluctant third parties confronted with opportunities to take costly acts that assist others.  
On the other hand, the greater resoluteness of second-party punishment reveals that those 
directly wronged by a transgression are willing to bend moral rules—in our case, dishonestly 
reporting the outcome of a die roll—to ensure the enactment of punishment. Hence, this suggests 
that institutions should be designed to ensure that, for instance, such a resoluteness does not 
compromise efficiency (Dreber et al., 2008; Rockenbach and Milinski, 2006; Egas and Riedl, 
2008; Xiao and Kunreuther, forthcoming) and lead to escalation of conflicts.  
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More broadly, our results highlight the importance of better understanding the motives 
that underlie different forms of pro-social behavior, in order to more accurately understand the 
impacts they are likely to have on society. While the willingness to incur costs to punish norm 
violators appears to be a robust phenomenon in settings where such a preference is directly 
elicited, our findings indicate that studying the extent to which such a stated preference actually 
ends up impacting social outcomes requires using more complex choices that shed light on the 
reluctance or resoluteness underlying such apparent preferences. 
 
References: 
Akerlof GA, Kranton RE (2000) Economics and Identity. Quarterly Journal of Economics 
115(3):715-753.  
Andreoni J, Rao JM, Trachtman H (2011). Avoiding the Ask: A Field Experiment on Altruism, 
Empathy and Charitable Giving. NBER Working Paper 17648. 
Balafoutas L, Nikiforakis N (2012) Norm Enforcement in the City: A Natural Field Experiment. 
European Economic Review 56(8):1773-1785.  
Balafoutas Loukas, Nikos Nikiforakis and Bettina Rockenbach. 2014. "Direct and indirect 
punishment among strangers in the field." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
111 (45), 15924-15927. 
Batson CD, Kennedy CL, Nord L, Stocks, EL, Fleming DA, Marzette CM, Lishner DA, Hayes 
RE, Kolchinsky LM, Zerger T (2007) Anger at unfairness: is it moral outrage? European 
Journal of Social Psychology 37(6):1272-1285. 
Benabou R, Tirole J (2006) Incentives and Prosocial Behavior. American Economic Review 
95(6):1652–1678. 
Bicchieri, C. Chavez, A. (2013) Third-Party sanctioning and compensation behavior: Findings 
from the ultimatum game” Journal of Economic Psychology 39: 268-277 
Broberg T, Ellingsen TM, Johannesson M (2007) Is Generosity Involuntary? Economics Letters 
94(1):32-37. 
Carlsmith K, Darley J, Robinson P (2002) Why do we punish? Deterrence and just deserts as 
motives for punishment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 83(2): 284-299. 
Carpenter JP, Matthews PH (2012) Norm Enforcement: Anger, Indignation or Reciprocity? 
Journal of the European Economic Association 10(3):555-572.  
 
 
17 
Charness G, Cobo-Reyes R, Jimenez N (2008) An investment game with third-party 
intervention. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 68(1):18-28. 
Chow S, Shao J, Wang H. 2008. Sample Size Calculations in Clinical Research. 2nd Ed. 
Chapman & Hall. 
Dana J, Cain DM, Dawes RM (2006) What you don’t know won’t hurt me: Costly (but quiet) 
exit in dictator games. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 100(2):193–
201. 
Dana J, Weber RA, Kuang J (2007) Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating 
an illusory preference for fairness. Economic Theory 33(1):67–80. 
DellaVigna S, List J, Malmendier U (2012) Testing for Altruism and Social Pressure in 
Charitable Giving, Quarterly Journal of Economics 127:1-56.  
Dreber A, Rand DG, Fudenberg D, Nowak MA (2008) Winners Don't Punish. Nature 452:348-
351. 
Egas M, Riedl A (2008) The economics of altruistic punishment and the maintenance of 
cooperation. Proceedings of the Royal Society B – Biological Sciences 275(1637):871-878. 
Ellingsen T, Johannesson M (2011) Conspicuous Generosity. Journal of Public Economics 95(9-
10):1131-1143. 
Erkal N, Gangadharan L, Nikiforakis N (2011) Relative Earnings and Giving in a Real-Effort 
Experiment. American Economic Review 101(7):3330-48. 
Fehr E, Gachter S (2002) Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature 415(6868): 137-140. 
Fehr E, Fischbacher U (2004) Third-party punishment and social norms. Evolution and Human 
Behavior 25(2):63-87. 
Fischbacher U (2007) z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. 
Experimental Economics 10(2):171-178. 
Fischbacher U, Heusi-Follmi F (2013) Lies in disguise: An experimental study on cheating. 
Journal of the European Economic Association 11(3):525-547. 
Guala F (2012) Reciprocity: Weak or Strong? What Punishment Experiments Do (and Do Not) 
Demonstrate. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35:1-15. 
Henrich J, et al. (2006) Costly punishment across human societies. Science 312(5781):1767-
1770. 
 
 
18 
Herrmann, Benedikt, Christian Thöni, and Simon Gächter. "Antisocial punishment across 
societies." Science 319.5868 (2008): 1362-1367. 
Haisley E, Weber RA (2010) Self-serving interpretations of ambiguity in other-regarding 
behavior. Games and Economic Behavior 68(2):634-645. 
Houser D, Xiao E (2010) "Inequality seeking punishment", Economics Letters, 109(1):20-23. 
Jordan, J. J. and McAuliffe, K. and Rand, D.G. (2005) The Effects of Endowment Size and 
Strategy Method on Third-Party Punishment. Working paper. 
Kurzban R, DeScioli P, O’Brien E (2007) Audience effects on moralistic punishment. Evolution 
and Human Behavior 28(215):75–84.  
Lazear EP, Malmendier UM, Weber RA (2012) Sorting in experiments with application to social 
preferences. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 4(1):136–163. 
Malmendier UM, te Velde VL, Weber RA (2014) Rethinking reciprocity. Annual Review of 
Economics, 6:849-874 
Nikiforakis Nikos and Helen Mitchell. 2014. "Mixing the carrots with the sticks: Third party 
punishment and reward" Experimental Economics 17 (1), 1-23. 
Pedersen, E. J., Kurzban, R., McCullough, M. E. (2013). Do humans really punish altruistically? 
A closer look. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 280, 20122723. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2012.2723. 
Piazza J, Bering JM (2008) The Effects of Perceived Anonymity on Altruistic Punishment. 
Evolutionary Psychology 6(3):487-501. 
Rockenbach B, Milinski M (2006) The efficient interaction of indirect reciprocity and costly 
punishment. Nature 444:718-72. 
Sanfey AG, Rilling JK, Aronson JA, Nystrom LE, Cohen JD (2003) The Neural Basis of 
Economic Decision-Making in the Ultimatum Game. Science 300:1755-1758. 
Shalvi S, Dana J, Handgraaf MJJ, De Dreu CKW (2011) Justified Ethicality: Observing Desired 
Counterfactuals Modifies Ethical Perceptions and Behavior. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes 115(2): 181-190. 
van der Weele JJ, Kulisa J, Kosfeld M, Friebel G (2014) Resisting Moral Wiggle Room: How 
Robust Is Reciprocal Behavior? American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 6(3): 256-64. 
Xiao E, Houser D (2005) Emotion Expression in Human Punishment Behavior. Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Science 102(20):7398-7401. 
 
 
19 
Xiao E, Kunreuther H. (forthcoming) Punishment and Cooperation in Stochastic Prisoner’s 
Dilemma Game. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 
Yamagishi T (1986) The provision of a Sanctioning System as a Public Good. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 51(1):110-116. 
 
 
  
 
 
20 
Fig. 1. The stated and enacted punishment by potential punishers in each of the three treatments. 
 
 
 
  
39.7
8.6
34.5
17.3
57.4
39.3
0
20
40
60
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f P
ot
en
tia
l P
un
ish
er
s
 
3P Self Report 3P Verified 2P Self Report
Note: In the 3P Verified treatment, we show the punishment enacted in expectation (50%).
Stated and Enacted Punishment by Treatment
Punishment Stated Punishment Enacted
 
 
21 
Fig. 2. Stated punishment expenditures by third-party subjects (Participant C) who expressed a 
preference for punishing at least one possible action by Participant A. 
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Table 1: Punishment Decisions and Die Rolls in Self-Report Treatments 
 
Stage 2 decisions 
First part  
(stated intention to punish) 
Second part  
(actual punishment) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Probability of 
punishing 
Magnitude of 
punishment 
Enact 
Punishment 
Enact 
Punishment 
2ndParty – Self Report 1.118** (0.5059) 
17.74** 
(7.025) 
1.265*** 
(0.367) 
1.157** 
(0.555) 
Amount given by Participant A -0.037*** (0.0078) 
-0.367 
(0.273)   
Amount given by Participant A 
X 2nd Party Self Report 
0.0034 
(0.0098) 
-0.272 
(0.343)   
Mean Punishment Expenditure    -0.024 (0.054) 
Mean Punishment Expenditure  
X 2nd Party Self Report    
0.022 
(0.058) 
Constant 1.1551*** (0.382) 
8.972 
(5.481) 
-0.781 
(0.292) 
-0.639 
(0.422) 
Observations 714 223 58 58 
Log likelihood -272.92 -741.87 -33.83 -33.72 
χ2 51.61 102.66 12.75 12.97 
 
Models include 3P Self Report and 2P Self Report conditions only; models 1and 2 include subject random effects; 
models 3 and 4 are probit regressions of the probability of reporting an even die roll. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2: Stated Intention of Punishment in Third Party Treatments 
 
  (1) (2) 
 
Probability of 
punishing 
Magnitude of 
punishment 
3rdParty – Verified -0.4959 (0.5545) 
-0.198 
(6.559) 
Amount given by Participant A -0.0389*** (0.0081) 
-0.302 
(0.218) 
Amount given  
X 3rd Party Verified 
0.0162 
(0.0110) 
0.0585 
(0.291) 
Constant -1.3637*** (0.416) 
11.25** 
(4.402) 
Observations 678 147 
Log likelihood -214.40 -445.20 
χ2 30.92 28.89 
Model 1 reports a probit regression of the binary decision of whether to punish and model 2 reports the results of a 
truncated linear regression of punishment amount; both models include 3P Self Report and 3P Verified conditions 
only and include subject random effects: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix A: Instructions (3rd Party Self Report) 
 
 
General Instructions 
 
This is an experiment in decision-making.  
 
In addition to a $5 show-up payment and $3 participation payment, you will be paid any money 
you accumulate from the experiment that will be described to you in a moment. You will be paid 
privately, in cash, at the conclusion of the experiment. The exact amount you receive will be 
determined during the experiment and will depend on your decisions and the decisions of others.  
If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and wait for an 
experimenter to come to you.  Please do not talk, exclaim, or try to communicate with other 
participants during the experiment. Participants intentionally violating these rules will be asked 
to leave the experiment and will not be paid their earnings from the experiment. 
 
During the experiment, payoffs will be expressed in points, not dollars. At the end of the 
experiment, points will be converted to dollars at the rate of $1 for every 10 points. 
 
In this experiment, there are three types of participants: Participants A, Participants B, and 
Participants C. The computer will randomly and anonymously match participants into groups of 
three with one participant of each type. You will never be informed of the identity of the two 
people with whom you are matched, either during or after the experiment. Similarly, the two 
other participants in your group will never be informed of your identity. You will be in the same 
three-person group for the entire experiment. 
 
Today’s experiment consists of two stages. Any money that you earn from the experiment will 
be added to your $5 show-up payment and $3 participation payment. At the conclusion of the 
second stage, the experiment will end and you will receive your earnings in cash.  
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Stage 1 Instructions 
 
At the beginning of this stage, the participants will receive the following number of points: 
• Participant A: 100 points 
• Participant B: 0 points 
• Participant C: 50 points 
 
In this stage, only Participant A will make a decision. Participant A will decide how many of the 
100 points to give to Participant B. Participant A can give Participant B between 0 and 50 points 
in increments of 10 points. That is, Participant A can choose to give 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, or 50 
points to Participant B. 
 
For example, if Participant A gives 40 points to Participant B, Participant A will have 60 
points (100 – 40) and Participant B will have 40 points (0 + 40) at the end of this stage. If 
Participant A gives 10 points to Participant B, Participant A will have 90 points (100 – 10) 
and Participant B will have 10 points (0 + 10) at the end of this stage. If Participant A gives 
0 points, Participant A will have 100 points and Participant B will have 0 points at the end 
of this stage. 
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Stage 2 Instructions 
 
In this stage, only Participant C will make decisions.  
 
Assigning deduction points 
 
For each possible amount of points that Participant A gave to Participant B in Stage 1, 
Participant C will decide how many deduction points he or she would like to assign to Participant 
A. Participant C will make these decisions before knowing Participant A’s actual choice in Stage 
1. Participant C can assign between 0 and 50 deduction points to Participant A. For each 
deduction point that Participant C assigns to Participant A, Participant A’s total number of points 
will be reduced by three and Participant C’s total number of points will be reduced by one.  
 
For example, if Participant C assigns 2 deduction points, Participant A’s total points will be 
reduced by 6 points (2x3) and Participant C’s total points will be reduced by 2 points. If 
Participant C assigns 19 deduction points, Participant A’s total points will be reduced by 57 
points (19x3) and Participant C’s total points will be reduced by 19 points.  
 
Participant C will specify how many deduction points to assign to Participant A, for every 
possible amount that Participant A could give to Participant B in Stage 1. These decisions will be 
made on a screen like the one shown below. 
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Implementing the assignment of deduction points 
 
After Participant C specifies the number of deduction points he or she would like to assign to 
Participant A for each possible decision by Participant A, a die roll will be used to determine 
whether or not Participant C’s decision is actually implemented, and whether any deduction 
points are actually assigned to Participant A. 
 
Participant C’s decision will either  
 
• be implemented, in which case the deduction points specified by Participant C, for the 
amount given by Participant A to Participant B, will be deducted from Participant C’s 
total number of points and three times as many points will be deducted from Participant 
A’s total number of points, or  
 
• not be implemented, in which case no points will be deducted from either Participant C or 
Participant A.  
 
Whether the decision is implemented will depend on a die roll reported by Participant C. 
Participant C will receive a paper cup containing a single six-sided die. Participant C will 
privately roll the die inside the cup, meaning that only Participant C will observe the outcome of 
the die roll. Participant C will then report the outcome of the die roll into the computer.  
 
• If the reported die roll is an even number, meaning it is either 2, 4 or 6, Participant C’s 
decision about how many deduction points to assign to Participant A will be 
implemented. That is, Participant C’s 50 points will be reduced by the specified number 
of deduction points and Participant A’s total points will be reduced by three times this 
amount.  
 
• If the reported die roll is an odd number, meaning it is either 1, 3 or 5, Participant C’s 
decision about how many deduction points to assign to Participant A will not be 
implemented. That is, Participant C will keep his or her entire 50 points and Participant 
A’s total number of points will not be changed. 
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Points Calculation 
 
The final number of points for each participant will be calculated as follows: 
 
If Participant C’s reported die roll is a 2, 4, or 6: 
 
• Participant A’s final number of points = 
 + 100 (starting points) 
  -  Points Participant A gave to Participant B in Stage 1 
-  3 x Number of deduction points assigned to Participant A by Participant C in Stage 2 
for the corresponding decision made by Participant A.  
 
• Participant B’s final number of points = 
 + Points received from Participant A in Stage 1 
 
• Participant C’s final number of points = 
 + 50 (starting points) 
-  Number of deduction points assigned to Participant A in Stage 2 for the corresponding 
decision made by Participant A 
 
 
If Participant C’s reported die roll is a 1, 3, or 5: 
 
• Participant A’s final number of points = 
+ 100 (starting points) 
-  Points Participant A gave to Participant B in Stage 1 
 
• Participant B’s final number of points = 
+ Points received from Participant A in Stage 1 
 
• Participant C’s final number of points = 
+ 50 (starting points) 
 
Your final number of points will be converted to dollars at the rate of $1 for every 10 points and 
added to your $5 show-up payment and $3 participation payment.  
 
Please note that it is possible for Participant A’s total number of points to be negative. In this 
case, the points will be deducted from Participant A’s participation payment. Additional 
deduction points that would result in net losses greater than the $3 participation payment for 
Participant A will not count against the earnings of either Participant A nor Participant C.  
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Final Results 
 
All decisions will be made through the computer. After all Stages 1 and 2 have finished, a results 
screen will reveal the following information: 
 
• Participant A’s decision of how many points to give to Participant B in Stage 1. 
• Participant C’s choice of deduction points in Stage 2. 
• Participant C’s reported die roll in Stage 2. 
• Your final number of points. 
• Your total earnings for the experiment. 
 
Are there any questions about the instructions?  If you have a question, please raise your hand 
and wait for the experimenter. 
 
To make sure that everyone understands the instructions, we will now proceed to some 
questions about the instructions, which you will answer on the computer. You may refer to 
these printed instructions if you need to in order to answer the questions.  
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Appendix B: Instructions (2nd Party Self Report) 
 
 
General Instructions 
 
This is an experiment in decision-making.  
 
In addition to a $5 show-up payment and $3 participation payment, you will be paid any money 
you accumulate from the experiment that will be described to you in a moment. You will be paid 
privately, in cash, at the conclusion of the experiment. The exact amount you receive will be 
determined during the experiment and will depend on your decisions and the decisions of others.  
If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and wait for an 
experimenter to come to you.  Please do not talk, exclaim, or try to communicate with other 
participants during the experiment. Participants intentionally violating these rules will be asked 
to leave the experiment and will not be paid their earnings from the experiment. 
 
During the experiment, payoffs will be expressed in points, not dollars. At the end of the 
experiment, points will be converted to dollars at the rate of $1 for every 10 points. 
 
In this experiment, there are two types of participants: Participants A and Participants B. The 
computer will randomly and anonymously match participants into groups of two with one 
participant of each type. You will never be informed of the identity of the person with whom you 
are matched, either during or after the experiment. Similarly, the other participant in your group 
will never be informed of your identity. You will be in the same two-person group for the entire 
experiment. 
 
Today’s experiment consists of two stages. Any money that you earn from the experiment will 
be added to your $5 show-up payment and $3 participation payment. At the conclusion of the 
second stage, the experiment will end and you will receive your earnings in cash.  
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Stage 1 Instructions 
 
At the beginning of this stage, the participants will receive the following number of points: 
• Participant A: 100 points 
• Participant B: 0 points 
 
In this stage, only Participant A will make a decision. Participant A will decide how many of the 
100 points to give to Participant B. Participant A can give Participant B between 0 and 50 points 
in increments of 10 points. That is, Participant A can choose to give 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, or 50 
points to Participant B. 
 
For example, if Participant A gives 40 points to Participant B, Participant A will have 60 
points (100 – 40) and Participant B will have 40 points (0 + 40) at the end of this stage. If 
Participant A gives 10 points to Participant B, Participant A will have 90 points (100 – 10) 
and Participant B will have 10 points (0 + 10) at the end of this stage. If Participant A gives 
0 points, Participant A will have 100 points and Participant B will have 0 points at the end 
of this stage. 
  
 
 
32 
Stage 2 Instructions 
 
In this stage, only Participant B will make decisions.  
 
Assigning deduction points 
 
For each possible amount of points that Participant A gave to Participant B in Stage 1, 
Participant B will decide how many deduction points he or she would like to assign to Participant 
A. Participant B will make these decisions before knowing Participant A’s actual choice in Stage 
1. Participant B can assign between 0 and 50 deduction points to Participant A. For each 
deduction point that Participant B assigns to Participant A, Participant A’s total number of points 
will be reduced by three and Participant B’s total number of points will be reduced by one.  
 
For example, if Participant B assigns 2 deduction points, Participant A’s total points will be 
reduced by 6 points (2x3) and Participant B’s total points will be reduced by 2 points. If 
Participant B assigns 19 deduction points, Participant A’s total points will be reduced by 57 
points (19x3) and Participant B’s total points will be reduced by 19 points.  
 
Participant B will specify how many deduction points to assign to Participant A, for every 
possible amount that Participant A could give to Participant B in Stage 1. These decisions will be 
made on a screen like the one shown below. 
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Implementing the assignment of deduction points 
 
After Participant B specifies the number of deduction points he or she would like to assign to 
Participant A for each possible decision by Participant A, a die roll will be used to determine 
whether or not Participant B’s decision is actually implemented, and whether any deduction 
points are actually assigned to Participant A. 
 
Participant B’s decision will either  
 
• be implemented, in which case the deduction points specified by Participant B, for the 
amount given by Participant A to Participant B, will be deducted from Participant B’s 
total number of points and three times as many points will be deducted from Participant 
A’s total number of points, or  
 
• not be implemented, in which case no points will be deducted from either Participant B or 
Participant A.  
 
Whether the decision is implemented will depend on a die roll reported by Participant B. 
Participant B will receive a paper cup containing a single six-sided die. Participant B will 
privately roll the die inside the cup, meaning that only Participant B will observe the outcome of 
the die roll. Participant B will then report the outcome of the die roll into the computer.  
 
• If the reported die roll is an even number, meaning it is either 2, 4 or 6, Participant B’s 
decision about how many deduction points to assign to Participant A will be 
implemented. That is, Participant B’s total points will be reduced by the specified 
number of deduction points and Participant A’s total points will be reduced by three 
times this amount.  
 
• If the reported die roll is an odd number, meaning it is either 1, 3 or 5, Participant B’s 
decision about how many deduction points to assign to Participant A will not be 
implemented. That is, Participant B will keep his or her total points and Participant A’s 
total number of points will not be changed. 
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Points Calculation 
 
The final number of points for each participant will be calculated as follows: 
 
If Participant B’s reported die roll is a 2, 4, or 6: 
 
• Participant A’s final number of points = 
 + 100 (starting points) 
  -  Points Participant A gave to Participant B in Stage 1 
-  3 x Number of deduction points assigned to Participant A by Participant B in Stage 2 
for the corresponding decision made by Participant A.  
 
• Participant B’s final number of points = 
 + Points received from Participant A in Stage 1 
-  Number of deduction points assigned to Participant A in Stage 2 for the corresponding 
decision made by Participant A 
 
 
If Participant B’s reported die roll is a 1, 3, or 5: 
 
• Participant A’s final number of points = 
+ 100 (starting points) 
-  Points Participant A gave to Participant B in Stage 1 
 
• Participant B’s final number of points = 
+ Points received from Participant A in Stage 1 
 
 
Your final number of points will be converted to dollars at the rate of $1 for every 10 points and 
added to your $5 show-up payment and $3 participation payment.  
 
Please note that it is possible for Participant A’s and/or Participant B’s total number of points to 
be negative. In this case, the points will be deducted from the participation payment. Additional 
deduction points that would result in net losses greater than the $3 participation payment for 
Participant A or Participant B will not count against the earnings of either Participant A nor 
Participant B.  
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Final Results 
 
All decisions will be made through the computer. After all Stages 1 and 2 have finished, a results 
screen will reveal the following information: 
 
• Participant A’s decision of how many points to give to Participant B in Stage 1. 
• Participant B’s choice of deduction points in Stage 2. 
• Participant B’s reported die roll in Stage 2. 
• Your final number of points. 
• Your total earnings for the experiment. 
 
Are there any questions about the instructions?  If you have a question, please raise your hand 
and wait for the experimenter. 
 
To make sure that everyone understands the instructions, we will now proceed to some 
questions about the instructions, which you will answer on the computer. You may refer to 
these printed instructions if you need to in order to answer the questions.  
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Appendix C: Instructions (3rd Party Verified) 
 
 
 
General Instructions 
 
This is an experiment in decision-making.  
 
In addition to a $5 show-up payment and $3 participation payment, you will be paid any money 
you accumulate from the experiment that will be described to you in a moment. You will be paid 
privately, in cash, at the conclusion of the experiment. The exact amount you receive will be 
determined during the experiment and will depend on your decisions and the decisions of others.  
If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and wait for an 
experimenter to come to you.  Please do not talk, exclaim, or try to communicate with other 
participants during the experiment. Participants intentionally violating these rules will be asked 
to leave the experiment and will not be paid their earnings from the experiment. 
 
During the experiment, payoffs will be expressed in points, not dollars. At the end of the 
experiment, points will be converted to dollars at the rate of $1 for every 10 points. 
 
In this experiment, there are three types of participants: Participants A, Participants B, and 
Participants C. The computer will randomly and anonymously match participants into groups of 
three with one participant of each type. You will never be informed of the identity of the two 
people with whom you are matched, either during or after the experiment. Similarly, the two 
other participants in your group will never be informed of your identity. You will be in the same 
three-person group for the entire experiment. 
 
Today’s experiment consists of two stages. Any money that you earn from the experiment will 
be added to your $5 show-up payment and $3 participation payment. At the conclusion of the 
second stage, the experiment will end and you will receive your earnings in cash.  
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Stage 1 Instructions 
 
At the beginning of this stage, the participants will receive the following number of points: 
• Participant A: 100 points 
• Participant B: 0 points 
• Participant C: 50 points 
 
In this stage, only Participant A will make a decision. Participant A will decide how many of the 
100 points to give to Participant B. Participant A can give Participant B between 0 and 50 points 
in increments of 10 points. That is, Participant A can choose to give 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, or 50 
points to Participant B. 
 
For example, if Participant A gives 40 points to Participant B, Participant A will have 60 
points (100 – 40) and Participant B will have 40 points (0 + 40) at the end of this stage. If 
Participant A gives 10 points to Participant B, Participant A will have 90 points (100 – 10) 
and Participant B will have 10 points (0 + 10) at the end of this stage. If Participant A gives 
0 points, Participant A will have 100 points and Participant B will have 0 points at the end 
of this stage. 
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Stage 2 Instructions 
 
In this stage, only Participant C will make decisions.  
 
Assigning deduction points 
 
For each possible amount of points that Participant A gave to Participant B in Stage 1, 
Participant C will decide how many deduction points he or she would like to assign to Participant 
A. Participant C will make these decisions before knowing Participant A’s actual choice in Stage 
1. Participant C can assign between 0 and 50 deduction points to Participant A. For each 
deduction point that Participant C assigns to Participant A, Participant A’s total number of points 
will be reduced by three and Participant C’s total number of points will be reduced by one.  
 
For example, if Participant C assigns 2 deduction points, Participant A’s total points will be 
reduced by 6 points (2x3) and Participant C’s total points will be reduced by 2 points. If 
Participant C assigns 19 deduction points, Participant A’s total points will be reduced by 57 
points (19x3) and Participant C’s total points will be reduced by 19 points.  
 
Participant C will specify how many deduction points to assign to Participant A, for every 
possible amount that Participant A could give to Participant B in Stage 1. These decisions will be 
made on a screen like the one shown below. 
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Implementing the assignment of deduction points 
 
After Participant C specifies the number of deduction points he or she would like to assign to 
Participant A for each possible decision by Participant A, a die roll will be used to determine 
whether or not Participant C’s decision is actually implemented, and whether any deduction 
points are actually assigned to Participant A. 
 
Participant C’s decision will either  
 
• be implemented, in which case the deduction points specified by Participant C, for the 
amount given by Participant A to Participant B, will be deducted from Participant C’s 
total number of points and three times as many points will be deducted from Participant 
A’s total number of points, or  
 
• not be implemented, in which case no points will be deducted from either Participant C or 
Participant A.  
 
Whether the decision is implemented will depend on a die roll by Participant C. Participant C 
will receive a paper cup containing a single six-sided die. The experimenter will observe 
Participant C roll the die and the experimenter will then enter the outcome of the die roll into the 
computer.  
 
• If the die roll is an even number, meaning it is either 2, 4 or 6, Participant C’s decision 
about how many deduction points to assign to Participant A will be implemented. That 
is, Participant C’s 50 points will be reduced by the specified number of deduction points 
and Participant A’s total points will be reduced by three times this amount.  
 
• If the die roll is an odd number, meaning it is either 1, 3 or 5, Participant C’s decision 
about how many deduction points to assign to Participant A will not be implemented. 
That is, Participant C will keep his or her entire 50 points and Participant A’s total 
number of points will not be changed. 
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Points Calculation 
 
The final number of points for each participant will be calculated as follows: 
 
If Participant C’s die roll is a 2, 4, or 6: 
 
• Participant A’s final number of points = 
 + 100 (starting points) 
  -  Points Participant A gave to Participant B in Stage 1 
-  3 x Number of deduction points assigned to Participant A by Participant C in Stage 2 
for the corresponding decision made by Participant A.  
 
• Participant B’s final number of points = 
 + Points received from Participant A in Stage 1 
 
• Participant C’s final number of points = 
 + 50 (starting points) 
-  Number of deduction points assigned to Participant A in Stage 2 for the corresponding 
decision made by Participant A 
 
 
If Participant C’s die roll is a 1, 3, or 5: 
 
• Participant A’s final number of points = 
+ 100 (starting points) 
-  Points Participant A gave to Participant B in Stage 1 
 
• Participant B’s final number of points = 
+ Points received from Participant A in Stage 1 
 
• Participant C’s final number of points = 
+ 50 (starting points) 
 
Your final number of points will be converted to dollars at the rate of $1 for every 10 points and 
added to your $5 show-up payment and $3 participation payment.  
 
Please note that it is possible for Participant A’s total number of points to be negative. In this 
case, the points will be deducted from Participant A’s participation payment. Additional 
deduction points that would result in net losses greater than the $3 participation payment for 
Participant A will not count against the earnings of either Participant A nor Participant C.  
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Final Results 
 
All decisions will be made through the computer. After all Stages 1 and 2 have finished, a results 
screen will reveal the following information: 
 
• Participant A’s decision of how many points to give to Participant B in Stage 1. 
• Participant C’s choice of deduction points in Stage 2. 
• Participant C’s die roll in Stage 2. 
• Your final number of points. 
• Your total earnings for the experiment. 
 
Are there any questions about the instructions?  If you have a question, please raise your hand 
and wait for the experimenter. 
 
To make sure that everyone understands the instructions, we will now proceed to some 
questions about the instructions, which you will answer on the computer. You may refer to 
these printed instructions if you need to in order to answer the questions.  
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Appendix D.  
 
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 reported treatment comparisons on the frequency of subjects who chose to 
punish at least one of the possible actions by the first party. To check the robustness of our 
results, we also examined the frequency of reported even rolls among those who punish at least 
once, twice, and so on. The results for each are reported below. All the p-values are for binomial 
tests of whether the reported number of even rolls is statistically different from an unbiased 
random process. 
 
Treatment 3P Self Report 2P Self Report 3P Verified 
Total number of subjects 58 61 55 
• Number of punishers who punished in at 
least 2 scenarios. 
16 32 15 
          Number (frequency) of even rolls 4 (25%) 22 (69%) - 
          p-value 0.077 0.050  
• Number of punishers who punished in at 
least 3 scenarios. 
15 30 14 
          Number (frequency) of even rolls 4 (27%) 21 (70%) - 
          p-value 0.118 0.043  
• Number of punishers who punished in at 
least 4 scenarios. 
13 25 11 
          Number (frequency) of even rolls 2 (15%) 18 (72%)  
          p-value 0.022 0.043  
• Number of punishers who punished in at 
least 5 scenarios. 
10 18 6 
          Number (frequency) of even rolls 2 (20%) 13 (72%)  
          p-value 0.109 0.096  
 
We also considered the number of instances (i.e. different amounts given by Participant A) under 
which a potential punisher stated an intention to punish and test differences by treatment with 
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. We find that the distribution of number of instances of stated 
punishment significantly differs between the 2P Self Report and 3P Self Report conditions 
(p=0.03), between the 2P Self Report and 3P Verified conditions (p=0.03), but not between the 
3P Self Report and 3P Verified conditions (p>0.99). Repeating the above comparison while 
excluding subjects who reported odd die rolls gives the same results (p-values of 0.03, 0.03, and 
0.99, respectively). 
 
